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Abstract 
The loads associated with Hurricane Katrina led to the destruction or severe damage of 
approximately 130,000 homes and over 200 deaths in the state of Mississippi.  This paper 
discusses the results of a field inspection of structural damage along the state’s Gulf Coast area 
caused by this hurricane.  It was found that reinforced concrete, steel frame, and heavy timber 
structures generally performed well, with minimal structural damage. Precast concrete, light 
frame wood, and bridge structures generally performed poorly.  Non-structural components of all 
building types, in particular facades and interior partitions subjected to storm surge, were 
typically destroyed.  For various structures, the primary cause of failure was found to be 
insufficient connection strength.  A comparison of Katrina’s storm surge and wind loads is made 
to those specified in current design standards.  It was found that Katrina’s forces exceeded those 
specified in design standards in many parts of the state. 
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Introduction 
Hurricane Katrina was among the worst natural disasters in U.S. history in terms of 
geographical coverage, structural damage, and accompanying fatalities.  Katrina first made 
landfall in south Florida on August 25, 2005 as a Category 1 hurricane, with wind speeds of 
approximately 36 m/s and gusts to 40 m/s.   Atmospheric and ocean conditions were conducive 
to rapid intensification, which led to Katrina attaining major hurricane (Category 3) status on the 
afternoon of the 26th. This intensification was also accompanied by an unusual expansion 
outwards of hurricane-force winds, transforming the storm into a large hurricane typically only 
seen in the Pacific Ocean. Continuing to strengthen and move northwards during the next 48 
hours, Katrina reached maximum wind speeds of 76 m/s (172 mph) (Category 5) on the morning 
of Sunday, August 28th.  Katrina’s hurricane-force winds extended 192 km from the storm 
center, and tropical storm-force winds 368 km outwards.  As such, Katrina was significantly 
larger than Hurrican Camille, the benchmark used for Gulf of Mexico hurricanes hitting the 
Mississippi coast since August 17, 1969.  Though Camille had peak wind speeds of 84 m/s, 
Katrina moved slower than Camille, thereby increasing the storm surge potential and time of 
wind exposure.  
Katrina made landfall on the morning of August 29 in Buras, LA, with a central pressure 
of 923 mb, the 4th lowest on record in the U.S. for a landfalling Atlantic storm. The size of the 
hurricane caused unprecedented destruction, resulting in a record storm surge in southeast 
Louisiana, coastal Mississippi, and coastal Alabama, and a wide swath of damage for the same 
region but extending over 200 km inland in some regions.   In Mississippi, about 68,000 homes 
were destroyed, and another 65,000 suffered major damage. As of this writing, the total death 
toll is between 1,300 and 1,400, with thousands more still unaccounted for.  Between 200 and 
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250 deaths occurred among residents of the Mississippi coastal area.  This places Katrina fifth in 
terms of hurricane fatalities, and the strom is the sixth deadliest natural disaster in U.S. history.  
Several weeks after the hurricane struck, in the last week of October 2005, a team of 
researchers from Mississippi State University traveled along the coast on State Highway 90 from 
Biloxi, MS to Waveland, MS, to survey and document the structural damage (White et al. 2006.)  
This route represents approximately two-thirds of the Mississippi coast and includes some of the 
most highly-damaged areas.  All cities along this route were surveyed, including Waveland, Pass 
Christian, Long Beach, Gulfport, and Biloxi (Fig. 1.)  The purpose of this paper is to summarize 
these findings.   
 
Hurricane Action 
There are two primary types of loads that structures must content with when exposed to 
hurricanes.  Water loads are created as a result of increases in water level and include the forces 
resulting from the movement of water onto land as an area becomes inundated.  Wind loads 
develop sustained and dynamic conditions as a result of the hurricane’s winds, as influenced by 
topography, ground cover, and adjacent obstructions. 
 
Water Loads  
In the initial stages of the hurricane, structures very near the coastline may be subjected 
to the impact of large surface waves.  Much of this energy is absorbed as the waves break in 
shallow water approaching land, however.  As time progresses, wind and wave action gradually 
raise the surface water level and propel the water further inland, resulting in a storm surge.   A 
secondary contribution to surge is from the reduced barometric pressure within the storm, which 
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causes a dome of water higher than the surrounding ocean.  The surge rises gradually at first, 
then more rapidly as the storm makes landfall.  Thus, the storm surge is relatively gradual and 
does not occur as a tidal wave, though the large wind-generated waves moving on top of the 
surging waters may create this impression. 
  The surge typically lasts several hours and affects about 160 km of coastline. Storm 
surge elevations typically vary from 1.5 to 7.5 m depending on a variety of hurricane conditions.   
At this stage, shoreline structures are subjected to a water head and associated lateral as well as 
buoyancy loads.  The large waves associated with the raised water level during the storm surge 
may now cause significant structural damage. These waves no longer break offshore but travel 
over the land surface and may break upon coastline structures.  This high wave action is perhaps 
the most severe structural load during the storm, and is the cause of most of the damage reported 
in this paper.  Additional associated loads include hydrodynamic forces, water-borne debris 
impact, and foundation erosion. 
Factors which affect storm surge elevation include: storm size; storm central pressure 
(lower interior atmospheric pressure increases the water level); maximum wind speed; 
bathymetry (as the surface currents driven by the wind reach shallow coastlines, bottom friction 
impedes the seaward return flow near the bottom, causing water to pile up; shallow areas with a 
gradual slope such as the Mississippi coastline will experience greater storm surges);  speed of 
the system (as a slow moving hurricane has a longer time to transport water onshore, slow 
systems are associated with higher storm surge); wave setup (the super-elevation required to 
drive the underflow, which can be quite large in hurricane conditions); and track angle (storms 
which make landfall perpendicular to the coastline generally produce larger storm surges.)  The 
strength of the surge in Mississippi was unexpected because the storm was slightly weaker than 
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Hurricane Camille in 1969.  However, Camille came from the south-southeast direction, whereas 
Katrina slammed inland directly from the south along the Louisiana-Mississippi border, probably 
the worst possible track for Mississippi. Katrina also moved a little slower than Camille, 
allowing more time for the water to pile up.  Although not directly a cause of the storm surge, 
Katrina’s impact also began at high tide, which added approximately one foot to the surge.  
 
Wind Loads 
Wind is fundamentally driven by differences in pressure, and there are several types of 
high-force winds that accompany a hurricane.  Hurricane intensity is defined by sustained winds, 
which is the average wind speed over a specified period of time at 10 m above the ground. In the 
Atlantic, this averaging is performed over a one-minute period.  Wind gusts typically last for less 
than 20 seconds and are usually from 1.25 to 1.65 times larger than sustained winds, depending 
on topography. Note that ASCE 7 (2003) considers the average wind speed over three seconds a 
design wind gust.  Some wind gusts are caused by downbursts, a strong downdraft that exits the 
base of a thunderstorm and spreads out at the earth's surface.    
As hurricanes make landfall, interactions with the thunderstorms form columns of rapidly 
rotating air that may contact the ground and develop tornadoes. Officially 11 hurricane-related 
tornadoes were reported in Mississippi, though there were several dozen additional unofficial 
reports of tornado sightings.  Finally, mesovortices may form in major hurricanes, which are 
whirling vortices that form at the boundary of the eyewall and eye where there is a tremendous 
change in wind speed.  Mesovortices are often five to ten times wider than a tornado, with wind 
speeds up to 90 m/s.  Little information is available on mesovortex formation in Katrina, but 
possible mesovortices were identified in the eyewall by satellite imaging. 
 6 
High winds primarily damage roofs and exterior structural components, but generally 
pose much less of a threat to structures than storm surge and wave action, which can produce 
loads orders of magnitude higher, and are severe enough in many cases to destroy entire 
structures.  An additional load associated with high wind is air-borne debris impact. 
 
Damage Observations 
Three general types of structures were surveyed: commercial buildings, residential 
(apartment buildings and single-family homes), and select pieces of the civil infrastructure 
(bridges).  For this study, observations are grouped into construction type (bridges, reinforced 
concrete buildings, steel buildings, and wood buildings) rather than occupancy type.  Unless 
otherwise noted, the damage described occurred to buildings located close to the coastline 
(generally within several hundred meters of the coast), and was due to storm surge. 
 
Bridges 
Biloxi Bay Bridge  
Constructed as a 2.4 km, 4-lane prestressed concrete highway bridge, the Biloxi Bay 
Bridge was part of US 90 and connected Biloxi to Ocean Springs (Fig. 1.)  All of the spans of the 
bridge’s superstructure (i.e. deck and girders) were raised and pushed in a northeasterly 
direction, dropping the west side of the superstructure from the supporting pier (Fig. 2.)   The 
piers below appear undamaged, and many of the spans are not damaged severely.  The bridge 
girders were not constrained to the bearings (Fig. 3), and the surge simply lifted the spans from 
the supports.   Thus it appears that connection inadequacy was the cause of failure.  A significant 
contributing factor may be the buoyant force.  Given that submerged concrete has its self-weight 
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effectively reduced by over 40%, as well as the possibility of air being trapped under the deck 
between adjacent girders as the surge rises, the failure is not surprising.  The surge also caused 
significant scour beneath the road on top of the abutments as well as the abutments themselves 
(Fig. 4.) 
 
Bay St. Louis Bridge  
This was a 3.2 km prestressed concrete bridge that spanned from Pass Christian to Bay 
St. Louis (Fig. 1)  This bridge lost all of its spans as they were pushed completely off of the pier 
supports (Fig. 5.)    There was some pier damage as well.  As all spans separated from the piers 
at the bearings and the visible spans appear intact, inadequate bearing up-lift strength was the 
cause of failure, as with the Biloxi Bridge.   In this case, the bearing was apparently tied to the 
superstructure but the strength of the connection as well as its embedment into the pier was 
simply inadequate  (Fig. 6.)  Serious scour was also observed (Fig. 7.) 
 
Reinforced Concrete Structures 
Nearly all of the reinforced concrete (RC) structural frames that were identified appeared 
to have performed well, with no apparent displacement, damage, or visible cracks.   However, 
this was not the case for building façades or interior walls, as these were often significantly 
damaged or entirely missing from the structure if it were struck by the storm surge.  Figure 8 
presents a typical structurally-undamaged low-rise RC frame.  Figure 9 illustrates another 
common RC structure on the Mississippi coast, where a slab and column system is used to 
support and elevate a wood structure above.  In this instance, the wood structure was completely 
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destroyed.  A private residence composed of an RC frame as well as RC exterior walls sustained 
no apparent damage to the frame or exterior walls (Fig. 10.) 
  On some buildings, the destruction of the façade and interior partitions may have 
alleviated more severe damage by preventing an extreme storm surge load to be transferred to 
the structural frame.  Similar to the smaller-scale structures, high-rise (10+ story) RC buildings 
on the coast often had the contents of the first one or two floors removed by the surge, but the 
upper floors as well as the entire structural frame appeared to have sustained no damage.  Figure 
11 represents a typical structure of this type. It may be expected that the larger RC buildings 
would survive as compared to smaller structures, as lower-floor member capacities are clearly 
greater than those composing 1-3 story buildings. Increased building mass may also serve to 
resist displacement due to wave impact as well as lateral-pressure induced sliding.   However, 
based on the observed failures of other types of structures, the authors contend that it is not 
primarily member capacity nor building mass but rather the connection strength of RC that lead 
to the survival of these structures.   
One of the two observed RC failures was the collapse of columns holding what may have 
been a pergola roof.  These columns failed at the base, a failure which may have been mitigated 
if stirrups were placed in the columns to provide confinement (Fig. 12.)  The other observed 
damaged RC building (Fig. 13) appears to have been struck by a large casino barge that washed 
onto the shore (not shown in the Figure), where only the impacted corner was damaged but the 
remainder of the structure was unaffected.  The local damage appears to have been well-
contained and did not visibly propagate to additional structural members.   Although no 
additional RC failures were identified in this study, others have reported a small number of RC 
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structural failures (Roberson et al. 2006).  These include flat and pre-stressed concrete building 
slabs, which may have failed due to moment reversals caused by the storm surge uplift. 
 
Precast Concrete Structures 
Unlike the RC structures, many of the precast concrete (PC) buildings observed sustained 
significant structural damage.  The members themselves appear to have had sufficient capacity, 
however, as all observed failures occurred at the connections.  Figure 14 shows an RC frame 
upon which PC floor slabs were placed.  Although the RC frame was undamaged, the PC slabs 
appeared to have detached at the connections and slid to the northwest.  Figure 15 shows a 
collapsed structure composed of PC girders supported by RC columns.   This structure appears to 
have been used to support a wood superstructure.  Here again the PC members were undamaged 
but failures occurred at the connections.  A detail of the failed connection is shown in Figures 16 
and 17.  A PC pedestrian bridge is also shown to have failed at the connections (Fig. 18.)   Here 
both girders were detached from the supporting column, and the canopy detached from the 
girders (which served as guardrails), with the steel connectors still visible on the top of the 
girders.  The second floor of a PC parking structure failed (Fig. 19) when the deck T-sections 
were pulled from their supports on the spandrel beam.  Some spandrel beams supporting the 
second floor also collapsed.  As with the observed bridge failures, buoyancy likely was a 
significant factor.  Here again the primary cause of failure appeared to be a lack of sufficient 
connection strength rather than member capacity.    It should be noted that other damage surveys 
have identified failed PC members in parking garages, apparently due to a moment reversal 
caused by the surge uplift force, as occurred with the RC slab failures identified (Roberson et al. 
2006).  In these cases, increasing connection strength alone may not have prevented the failures. 
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Steel Frame Structures 
Similar to the RC structures, most steel frames appeared to have survived intact, with 
little or no damage.  As with the RC structures, this does not include the façade and interior 
walls, whether made of masonry, wood, or steel studs.  Figures 20-23 show typical such 
structures.  There were some exceptions, however.  Figure 24 shows a collapsed steel frame.  
Here the metal roof as well as the supporting purlins were bent upward, perhaps by wind, 
resulting in a loss of lateral stability that caused the first frame to collapse inward.   Open web 
steel joist construction did not perform as well as wide-flange or built-up steel frame 
construction, a structural type for which several failures were observed.  Figure 25 illustrates 
such a collapse.  Here it appears that the far wall was toppled by the surge, causing the roof to 
collapse.   Based on failures similar to those shown in Figure 24, as well as the observation that 
most steel frame failures occurred for structures with relatively slender members, it appears that 
the primary area of concern for the performance of steel structures under hurricane loads is 
stiffness and lateral stability rather than insufficient member capacity.   
 
Wood Structures 
As a rule, light-frame wood structures along the coastline were almost entirely destroyed.  
The typical remains of coastline residence is shown in Fig. 26, where sub-structural columns 
(often made of heavy-timber or RC) survived but the supported house did not.  Unfortunately, 
large numbers of images such as this line the Mississippi coast.  Primary failures were at the 
nailed connections, as searching through debris piles revealed that most of the wood members 
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were intact.  For wood structures that were not destroyed by storm surge, several common types 
of damage were seen: 
1. Roof failures. This generally occurred away from the coastline where the water surge 
was not great enough to topple the structure. As expected, roof damage typically occurred 
near the edges rather than central portion of the roof, where uplift forces are highest.  The 
sheathing panels appeared to have lifted whole from the roof, indicating a lack of 
connection strength rather than panel bending capacity.  Figure 27 presents a commonly-
observed type of roof sheathing failure.  This observation was experimentally verified as 
well (Schiff et al., 1996).  Higher winds produced more extensive damage to the roof 
structure itself, which was also frequently observed (Fig. 28.) 
 
2. Siding and wall sheathing failures.  As noted previously as being common on steel 
frame and RC frame buildings as well, siding and sheathing stripped from the structure is 
primarily a sign of wind damage (Fig. 29), though more extensive damage to sheathing 
may indicate high water loads.  Again, most losses of siding are indicative of insufficient 
fastener strength. 
3. Side-sway failures.  Figure 30 is representative of this type of failure. Of the three 
general types of light-frame wood structure failures observed, these were much less 
common than the other two outlined above.  The loss of lateral stability could have been 
induced either by a wind or storm surge overload. 
 
Unlike light-frame construction, heavy timber and glued-laminated frame structures 
appeared to have fared as well as steel and RC.   Of course the connection strength (typically 
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bolted) and member stiffness are much greater than those associated with the dimensional 
lumber in light-frame construction.  Common timber structural systems that survived were post-
and-beam pier substructures used to support a light-frame wood house above (Fig. 31.)  Other 
structures included docks (Fig. 32) and glued-laminated frames (Fig. 33.)  Although damage was 
observed on some of these systems, in general it appeared to be minimal.   
 
Comparison to Current Standards 
ASCE 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE 2002), 
provides design loads for wind and storm surge loads, and ASCE 24,  Flood Resistant Design 
and Construction (ASCE 2002),  provides additional guidance to mitigate storm surge.   Most 
building codes, such as the International Building Code (2003) and International Residential 
Code (2003) incorporate ASCE 7 and 24 standards directly or by reference (note as of this 
writing, ASCE 7, ASCE 24, the IBC and IRC are in the process of being revised to interface 
more closely and the most current editions should be available in early 2006). 
 
Storm Surge  
Observations and data on Katrina’s storm surge cycle generally do not exist because all 
of the tide gauges failed along the Mississippi coast as a result of the storm.  Storm surge heights 
are thus estimated from computational simulation and post-storm high-water mark 
measurements.  High water mark surveys were conducted by a variety of agencies, including the 
National Weather Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the US Geological Survey, and private 
companies.   Surge values between 8.5 and 9.4 m have been documented between Pearlington 
and Bay St. Louis, MS.  High water marks between 6 and 8.2 m occurred between Bay St. Louis 
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and Biloxi (Fig 1.)  Ocean Springs and Pascagoula experienced smaller but still significant surge 
values ranging from 3.6 to 5.8 m  (White et al. 2006.)     
Data from simulations predicting water levels are producing similar values.  The results 
of numerical simulation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Advanced Circulation (ADCIRC) 
fully nonlinear hydrodynamic model (Luettich and Westerink 2000) are compared to observed 
water marks in Table 1.  The table also presents Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Base Flood Elevations (BFE) found on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) to the 
observed and simulated high-water levels for four communities along the Mississippi Gulf Coast.  
The BFE represents the water level associated with a flood that has a 1% probability of 
occurrence each year.  In typical cases, ASCE 7 and ASCE 24 reference the FEMA BFE  to the 
Design Flood Elevation (DFE).  In each case considered in Table 1, the BFE was exceeded 
(typical along the coastline).  Coastal high water elevations along the Mississippi Gulf Coast in 
most areas varied from Waveland to Gulfport from approximately 7.5-9 m, and from Gulfport to 
Pascagoula from about 4.5-6 m.  In contrast, FEMA BFEs along the coast from Waveland to 
Gulfport varied from 3.3-5.8 m, while from Gulfport to Pascagoula ranged from 2.7-6 m (White 
et al. 2006.)   
The estimated difference in storm surge design loads caused by the observed storm surge 
levels in Table 1 and the FEMA BFEs are shown in Table 2.  Design loads (unfactored) are 
computed for a typical single-story house with a peak roof height of 4.5 m, using the simplified 
procedure outlined in ASCE 7 Section 5.  Here surge load is taken as the sum of a hydrostatic 
component (approximately 15% of total load), a hydrodynamic component (5%), and wave 
impact (80%).   The procedure outlined in ASCE 7 assumes a stillwater depth of 65% of the BFE 
and a wave height of 78%.  In the sample calculations, water velocity is taken as 3 m/s (upper 
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limit for the simplified design procedure), coefficient of drag is taken as 1.25 (minimum 
allowed), and the building is assumed to be in importance category 2 (typical for a residence), 
with dynamic pressure coefficient equal to 2.8.  The building is assumed to be enclosed.  Results 
in Table 2 are given in terms of force per unit length  on the exterior building wall facing the 
surge.  As seen in Table 2, estimated Katrina storm surge levels result in significantly larger 
forces (from 1.4 to 4.0 times) than those based on the pre-storm BFEs.  The large difference is 
primarily due to the wave load, which is a function of the square of water depth. 
 
Wind Gusts 
Figure 34 shows superimposed ASCE 7 basic design wind speed gusts to wind gusts 
estimated for Hurricane Katrina.  The Katrina wind gusts  were estimated by numerical 
simulation from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Atlantic 
Oceanography and Meterology Lab H*Winds models, as well as in situ data collection (White et 
al. 2006.)  Wind data collected from weather stations generally revealed lower gust speeds than 
the NOAA estimate, as shown in Table 3.  The estimates are within reasonable agreement, 
however.  As shown in Figure 34, the design winds are exceeded in a relatively narrow swath of 
land in the southeastern portion of the state.   The maximum difference between the estimated 
Katrina wind speeds and the design wind speed is approximately 13 m/s, and occurs just south of 
the 49 m/s wind design speed contour, where the peak of the estimated 63 m/s wind gust contour 
appears.   Based on the example residence above, assuming a 20 degree (approximately 4:12 
pitch) gable roof in typical exposure C topography with importance factor 1.0, design wind 
pressures (unfactored) are given in Table 4 for a 49 m/s and 63 m/s wind.  Values are computed 
using Method I in ASCE 7, a simplified analytical procedure.  Considering both the main wind 
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resisting structural system as well as components and cladding, the Katrina-estimated 63 m/s 
wind is expected to apply lateral pressures of approximately 1.6 times those of the 49 m/s design 
wind.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The performance of a variety of building types along the Mississippi coast exposed to the 
extreme loads imposed by Hurricane Katrina was summarized in this study.  Based on these 
observations, several recommendations can be made. 
 
1. Explore current land use policy.  As most structural damage was caused by storm surge, the 
concentration should be on water loads rather than wind loads.   Several possibilities should be 
considered with regard to land use and water loads, including  restricting certain construction or 
building occupancy types, or increasing construction standards in certain areas.    Many of these 
decisions have been already made, or are currently under consideration, by local authorities. 
 
2. Reconsider design loads.  Two issues are important: rate of return and the expected load.  
Considering the rate of return, a 100-year (i.e. 1% chance of a flood of this magnitude per year) 
flood is the typical rate of return used for flood design, while a 50-year wind is the basis for wind 
gust consideration.  A determination must be made whether this rate of return adequate, or to 
consider a longer (or shorter) period of time.  Considering the expected load associated with the 
rate of return, it would also be prudent to investigate whether the current hurricane design loads 
sufficiently reflect the actual imposed loads.  A re-consideration of the appropriate design flood 
elevation should be made, as many coastal base flood elevations were significantly exceeded.  As 
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of this writing, FEMA is in the process of updating BFEs.  Similar to water loads, wind speeds 
were significantly exceeded in many parts of the state as well.  
 
3. Maintain consistency in safety level.  From a structural safety point of view, it makes little 
sense for structures of the same importance to be designed to different levels of reliability.  The 
goal of a design standard is not only to ensure a minimum level of safety, but also to ensure 
consistency in reliability, the primary issue that Load and Resistance Factor Design standards 
attempt to address.  This fundamental goal is difficult if not impossible to achieve if consistent 
standards are not enforced.  Unlike its neighboring states, Mississippi currently has no statewide 
design standard. 
 
4. Address specific hurricane design and construction standards for the various building types.   
It appears that most structural frames of steel, reinforced concrete, heavy timber, and glued-
laminated wood performed well during the storm surge.  With the possible exception of a lateral 
stability concern for steel frames and uplift loads which may cause negative moments for some 
concrete structures, this suggests that existing design and construction practices for these types of 
structures may be adequate.  It is advisable to verify this adequacy under the expected storm 
surge loads, however, with particular regard to assessment of safety level.  Conversely, precast 
concrete structures exposed to the storm surge load did not perform well.  Member capacity 
generally appeared adequate but connection strength was often insufficient.   Thus, it is 
recommended to investigate the adequacy of connection design strength. 
Observations made for this study also suggest that bridge superstructures had adequate 
capacity. As with precast concrete buildings, a lack of  connection restraint caused the observed 
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failures.   An investigation of  bearing connection strength is recommended.  Most light-frame 
wood structures subjected to storm surge were destroyed.   It appears that most failures occurred 
at the fasteners. However, it is not known whether strengthened connections alone would have 
resulted in substantial decreases in damage, as overall structural system resistance to a lateral 
load such storm surge is much less than that found in the survived commercial-grade frames.   
An investigation to determine the desired and current design strengths is recommended, and how 
the gap between these can be closed.  Particular attention should be paid to fastener strength.  
Finally, facades of all types in general did not perform well.  Here two design 
possibilities exist: facades are either designed to withstand storm surge or they are designed to 
break away to avoid overloading the structure.  The latter case may be most appropriate for the 
lower floors of most coastline structures.  Once a desired level of performance is determined, 
numerous ways exist to achieve this level with a variety of façade types. 
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Figure 9. Underside of a typical undamaged RC frame and slab, used to support a  
(destroyed) wood building above. 
Figure 10. Undamaged RC frame and exterior wall structure (private residence). 
Figure 11. Typical undamaged structure of high-rise RC frame, with first floor façade and  
contents destroyed. 
Figure 12. RC failed columns. 
Figure 13. RC frame building struck by casino boat. 
Figure 14. Failed connections of PC slabs supported by a RC frame. 
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Figure 15.  Collapsed PC girder system. 
Figure 16. Failed PC column connection. 
Figure 17. Failed PC girder connection. 
Figure 18. Failed PC pedestrian bridge. Note detachment at connections. 
Figure 19. Collapsed T-beams of PC parking structure. 
Figure 20. Typical survived steel frame, with façade and interior contents removed by storm 
surge. 
Figure 21. Typical survived steel frame. 
Figure 22. Typical multi-story survived steel frame. 
Figure 23. Survived steel frame. 
Figure 24.  Steel frame lateral stability failure. 
Figure 25.  Failed steel frame with open-web joist roof. 
Figure 26. Typical remains of wood structure, where only pier system survived. 
Figure 27. Typical wood roof sheathing failure.  Note panel is removed whole and at roof  
Edge. 
Figure 28.  Typical wood roof structural system failure. 
Figure 29.  Typical wood roof siding and sheathing failure. 
Figure 30.  Wood house side-sway failure. 
Figure 31.  Typical timber beam and pier system. 
Figure 32. Survived glued-laminated dock. 
Figure 33.  Survived glued-laminated frame. 
Figure 34. Code (horizontal contours) and Katrina (vertical contours) wind gusts (MPH). 
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Table 1. Comparison of Base Flood Elevations and Katrina High Water Levels 
MS Location FEMA 
BFE (m) 
Observed Katrina 
Water Level (m) 
Simulated Katrina 
Water Level (m) 
Pass Christian 3.9-5.5 7.6 7.6-9.1 
Bay St. Louis 3.9-5.2 8.2 7.6-9.1 
Gulfport 5.5 6.7 7.6-9.1 
Pascagoula 3.0-3.9 3.6-5.2 4.5-6.1 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of BFE and Estimated Actual Surge Loads 
MS Location BFE Load 
(kN/m) 
Estimated Actual 
Load (kN/m) 
Actual / 
BFE 
Pass Christian 854 1591 3.5 - 1.9 
Bay St. Louis 767 1825 4.0 - 2.4 
Gulfport 458 1245 2.7 
Pascagoula 458 767 1.4 - 1.7 
 
 
Table 3. Estimated and Measured Wind Gusts 
MS Location Measured Gust 
(m/s) 
Simulated Gust 
(m/s) 
Waveland 54-58 64 
Biloxi 49-51 44 
Ocean Springs 47 44 
Pascagoula 44 42 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Design and Measured Wind Gust Pressures 
Lateral Pressure on Main Wind Resisting Structural System, Walls 
  Wind Pressure  
Location on Wall* 49 m/s Wind 63 m/s Wind Ratio, (49) / (63)  
Interior (region C)  1.03 (kN/m2) 1.66 (kN/m2) 1.61 
Edges   (region A) 1.54  2.49 1.62 
    
Uplift Pressure on Components and Cladding, Roof 
  Wind Pressure  
Location on Roof* 49 m/s Wind 63 m/s Wind Ratio, (49) / (63)  
Interior  (zone 1)  -1.13 (kN/m2) -1.82 (kN/m2) 1.61 
Edges    (zone 2)  -1.90 -3.00 1.58 
Corners (zone 3)  -2.78 -4.50 1.62 
 *Specific locations for ”regions” and “zones” are defined in ASCE 7, Figures 6.2 and 6.3.   
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Figure 1. Extent of survey along State Highway 90. 
 
 
Figure 2. Collapsed Spans of Biloxi Bay Bridge. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Biloxi Bay Bridge bearings show lack of adequate connection to superstructure. 
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Figure 4.  Biloxi Bay Bridge road undermining. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Completely displaced spans of Bay St. Louis Bridge. 
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Figure 6.  Insufficient connection strength of Bay St. Louis Bridge bearings. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Bay St. Louis Bridge abutment undermining. 
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Figure 8. Typical undamaged RC frame with destroyed façade and gutted interior. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Underside of a typical undamaged RC frame and slab, used to support a (destroyed) 
wood building above. 
 
 
Figure 10. Undamaged RC frame and exterior wall structure (private residence). 
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Figure 11. Typical undamaged structure of high-rise RC frame, with first floor façade and 
contents destroyed. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. RC failed columns. 
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Figure 13. RC frame building struck by casino boat. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Failed connections of PC slabs supported by a RC frame. 
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Figure 15.  Collapsed PC girder system. 
 
 
Figure 16. Failed PC column connection. 
 
 
Figure 17. Failed PC girder connection. 
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Figure 18. Failed PC pedestrian bridge. Note detachment at connections. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Collapsed T-beams of PC parking structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Typical survived steel frame, with façade and interior contents removed by storm 
surge. 
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Figure 21. Typical survived steel frame. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Typical multi-story survived steel frame. 
 
 
Figure 23. Survived steel frame. 
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Figure 24.  Steel frame lateral stability failure. 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Failed steel frame with open-web joist roof. 
 
 
Figure 26. Typical remains of wood structure, where only pier system survived. 
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Figure 27. Typical wood roof sheathing failure.  Note panel is removed whole and at roof edge. 
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Typical wood roof structural system failure. 
 
 
 
Figure 29.  Typical wood roof siding and sheathing failure. 
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Figure 30.  Wood house side-sway failure. 
 
 
Figure 31.  Typical timber beam and pier system. 
 
 
Figure 32. Survived glued-laminated dock. 
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Figure 33.  Survived glued-laminated frame. 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Code (horizontal contours) and Katrina (vertical contours) wind gusts (MPH). 
 
